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Abstract  This paper presents the updated conceptual framing of the CLICO research project, and evaluates the contribution of the CLICO research findings to theory on hydro‐climatic security. We draw out the  theoretical  findings  from twenty outputs of  the  five CLICO research work packages  including twelve  case  studies  in  the  Mediterranean,  the  Middle  East  and  the  Sahel  region,  where  climate related water  stresses  threaten  insecurity. We  relate  these  findings  to  seven  research  questions.  We  then  provide  an  updated  conceptual  framework  of  hydro‐climatic  security  based  on  the findings and a summary of the key theoretical findings of the CLICO research.   We find that climate change and water related stressors may exacerbate human insecurity either directly  by  adding  to  existing  sources  of  human  insecurity,  or  through maladaptive  policies  and interventions designed by governments in the name of adaptation to climate change. Factors that influence  conflict  situations  and  human  security  are  multi‐scalar  and  in  most  cases,  more dependent on political, social and economic conditions rather than environmental factors. Conflict that  is  severe  and  prolonged  is  a  significant  driver  of  vulnerability  to  hydro‐climate  stressors. Cooperation,  and  more  specifically  coordination  and  communication  between  groups  and institutions  is  seen  as  an  important  contributor  to  adaptive  capacity.  Without  this  divergent 
adaptation  can  occur, where  one  individual  or  group’s  adaptation  can  reduce  another’s  adaptive capacity.  Some  debate  exists  as  to  the  desirability  of  state  intervention  in  adaptation  and  what constitutes adaptive capacity. Adaptation planning can be conflictive and present  risks  to human security when it fails to take into account different perspectives, values and knowledge bases and is open to manipulation by state actors. Case study evidence also supports arguments in favour of a balance  between  incrementalism  and  transformation,  since  transformational  adaptation  risks exacerbating some types of human insecurities. 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1. Introduction  The CLICO project examines the relationship between climate change and hydro‐climatic stressors, conflict  and  human  security.  The  project  consists  of  five  research  based  work  packages.  Work package 1  is  the  theoretical  framing of  the project,  of which  this  report  is  part. Work package 2 consists of  twelve case studies of hydro‐climatic hot  spots  in  the Mediterranean,  the Middle East and the Sahel region (see Figure 1 for a map showing the case study locations). Work package 3 is a large‐N  study  of  conflict  and  cooperation  in  domestic  water  related  events.  Work  package  4 examines policies and  institutional  frameworks relevant  for responses  to hydro‐climatic stresses. Work  package  5  examines  adaptive  capacity  and  conflict  resolution  mechanisms  at  the international scale for transboundary river basins.   The  CLICO  project  was  underpinned  by  a  conceptual  framework  developed  by  the  consortium partners in the first six months of the project. The aim of the framework was to provide a guide for the research in the different work packages of the project and to stimulate suggestions of research hypotheses or questions that could be addressed. As a primary output of the project, CLICO aimed to  develop  and  sharpen  the  concepts  and  relationships  of  terms  used  in  this  framework  and contribute  to  the  theoretical  development  of  understandings  of  hydro‐climatic  security  (how climate and water related hazards influence human security).   This  report presents  the  conceptual  framing of  the CLICO  research project developed during  the first six months of the project and the seven initial research questions that guided the research in the four empirical work packages of the project. The report then evaluates the contribution of the research findings to theory on hydro‐climatic security – an exploration of the relationship between water‐related climate risks and human security. The report draws on these findings to propose a revised version of the conceptual framework and a set of key theoretical findings.   
 
Figure 1: Map of the CLICO case study locations (Source: Bruggeman et al. 2012) 




Figure 2: Multiple scale relations between the economic, political and environmental context, climate and 
water-related stressors, conflict and cooperation and human security.  The  framework  shown  in  Figure  1  focuses  on  the  human  security  of  elements  within  a  social‐ecological  system  and  conflict  and  cooperation  interactions within  that  system  as  the  objects  of study. A social‐ecological system is one in which the linkages between society and the environment are  considered  (Gunderson  and  Holling,  2002,  p122).  In  this  conceptual  framework  we  are interested  in  the  social,  political,  environmental/ecological,  and  economic  aspects  of  the  system under  study.  The  boundaries  of  the  system  under  consideration  must  be  defined  and  linkages between  different  scales  are  often  important  to  recognise.  Human  security  can  be  described  as protection of individuals or communities from threats and disruption as well as protection of their rights and basic needs (Human Security Network, 2010; Kaldor, 2007; UNDP, 1994) and is closely related  to  concepts  such  as  human well‐being.  Conflict  and  cooperation  are  terms  often  used  to qualify  interactions  occurring  at  different  intensities  and  geographic  scales  within  or  between individuals,  communities  and  states,  varying over  time  and  frequently  coexisting  (Goulden  et  al., 2009; Keohane, 2005; Yoffe et al., 2003; Zeitoun, 2007; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). Conflict has also been distinguished by whether it is latent (not expressed), overt (or manifest, but non‐violent) and violent (Lund, 2009). “Cooperation should not be viewed as the absence of conflict but rather as  a  reaction  to  conflict  or  potential  conflict”  (Keohane,  2005,  p54).    Keohane  (2005)  describes 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cooperation  as  occurring  “when  actors  adjust  their  behaviour  to  the  actual  or  anticipated preferences of others” (p51).    The multiple spatial scales shown in Figure 1 recognise the importance of the global or regional1, national and sub‐national scale economic, political and environmental contexts. The social system depicted in Figure 1 can be examined at any of these spatial and temporal scales and may indeed cross scales, depending on  the system being studied. We also recognise a need  to  incorporate an understanding of different temporal scales within the framework, although it was not practical to reflect this on the diagram.   CLICO  research  investigated  the  causal  links  between  environmental  factors  (climate  and water related  stressors,  being  our  focus)  conflict  and  cooperation  and  human  security  as  well  as  the causal links between political and economic factors, human security and conflict and cooperation, as indicated by the two large arrows in Figure 1.    The  lower  of  the  two  large  arrows  depicts  potential  causal  links  from  the multi‐scale  economic political  and  environmental  context  to  the  social‐ecological  system  under  study.  Political  and economic contexts influence socio‐ecological systems in a variety of ways and at a range of scales, including  for  instance  the  systems’  integration  into  the  international  trade  in  food  staples  and ‘virtual water’ (Allan, 2001), international political relations with regional states and international donors,  the  domestic  policies  and  capacities  of  state  institutions,  and  internal  unevenness  in patterns  of  economic  development.  Analysis  of  these  factors  could  involve  consideration  of institutions, social relations, power, interests and knowledge. Institutions and social relations also govern access to natural resources and influence the wider environmental context.   The upper large arrow depicts a hypothesized relationship between stressors or hazards related to the  climate  and  water  system,  at  a  range  of  scales  and  the  object  of  study,  in  terms  of  human security  and  cooperation  and  conflict  interactions  within  the  social‐ecological  system. We  focus primarily  on  water  related  stressors  associated  with  climate  change  and  climate  variability,  for example  droughts,  water  scarcity,  extreme  rainfall  and  sea  level  rise  leading  to  flooding  and salinisation of freshwater, however other climate change stressors such as extreme and increasing temperatures are also relevant, for some of the case studies. The term climate variability is used to describe shorter term variations in climate, for example of decades or less, whereas climate change refers to longer term variations in climate of several decades or longer and includes projections of change in climate for the future  (Watson, 2001).  Exposure of the social‐ecological system to climate and water related stressors leads to risks to the vulnerable  elements  of  the  socio‐ecological  system.  We  draw  from  the  disaster  risk  reduction literature in recognizing that risks are the product of the interaction of the climate change related stressors or hazards  and  the vulnerability of  the  system, which  is  linked  to  its  adaptive  capacity (Birkmann,  2006;  Wisner  et  al.,  2004).  We  also  recognize  that  there  may  be  opportunities 
                                                        
1 We use ‘regional’ to refer to regions within continents, e.g. eastern Africa, southern Europe. 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associated with climate change, and for this reason we use the term stressor rather than hazard on the diagram.   Vulnerability  has  different  dimensions  (e.g.  physical,  social,  environmental,  economic,  and institutional) and causal factors including exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (Adger, 2006; Birkmann,  2006;  Füssel,  2007).  The  exposure  of  the  social‐ecological  system  to  stressors  is  the extent to which the system experiences the stress or hazard and is influenced by, for example, the location  of  the  system  and  the  magnitude,  frequency,  duration  and  geographical  extent  of  the stressor.  The  system’s  sensitivity  is  “the  degree  to  which  a  system  is  modified  or  affected”  by stressors (Adger, 2006). Adaptive capacity can be related to the coping range or thresholds within which  an  individual,  group  or  system  is  able  to  deal  with  or  recover  from  stresses  (Smit  and Wandel, 2006) and is context and scale specific (Vincent, 2007). In addition to examining adaptive capacity  we  are  also  interested  in  understanding  the  actual  goals,  processes  and  outcomes  of adaptation, defined by Brooks (2003) as  ‘adjustments in a system’s behaviour and characteristics that enhance its ability to cope with external stress’. We are also interested in identifying instances and  causes  of  ‘maladaptation’  (Barnett  and  O'Neill,  2010),  i.e.  adaptation  that  increases  the vulnerability of some groups, sectors or systems.  The  nature  of  the  hypothesized  relationships  between  human  security  and  conflict  and cooperation, vulnerability and adaptive capacity have been examined in the CLICO case studies and work packages as indicated by the dashed arrows in Figure 1. The human security of the system or social  group  under  consideration was  the main  object  of  study  in  the  CLICO  research,  although some  case  studies  and  work  packages  focused  more  on  some  elements  of  the  framework  than others. Although human security can be thought of as operating primarily at the sub‐national level, there are cross‐scale elements, e.g.  safety‐nets provided by governments,  international solidarity. We  suggest  in  the  framework  that  human  security  may  be  influenced  by  the  vulnerability  and adaptive capacity of the system which may act as filters or amplifiers of risk associated with climate and water  related stressors and other political‐economic and environmental  factors. Conflict and cooperation  interactions were hypothesized as potential amplifiers of human security  in addition to being an object of study.   The  CLICO  project  adopts  a  political  ecology  approach  for  some  of  the  case  studies  and  in  this  theoretical analysis. Kallis and Zografos (2012) portray political ecology as a discipline that focuses attention on ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and the distribution of costs and benefits of socio‐environmental change, and which studies power over access and use of resources (Watts and Peet ,1996). Political ecologists consider the expansive metabolism of societies and the uneven processes of a globalising economy,  side‐by‐side  with  uneven  power  distributions  as  the  fundamental  causes  of  unequal vulnerability distribution.  A  set  of  seven  research  questions,  listed  in  Box  1,  were  proposed  alongside  the  conceptual framework  to  guide  the  research  of  the  work  packages,  exploring  different  elements  of  the framework.  The  findings  from  CLICO  research  that  relate  to  these  questions  are  presented  in section  3.  In  section  4 we  present  a  revised  theoretical  framework  of  hydro‐climatic  security  in response to the findings and in section 5 we provide a summary of the key theoretical findings of the CLICO project.  




Box 1: Seven proposed research questions   1. How  is  human  security  affected  by  risks  associated  with  water  and  climate‐related stressors, societal vulnerability and social‐political factors? This can be expanded into two sub‐questions: What  is  the relative  importance of environmental risks compared to social and political factors? And what are the mechanisms by which these risks and vulnerabilities amplify each other at different scales?   2. How do political, economic, environmental and climatic factors exacerbate or mitigate water‐related conflict?   3. How does human security (or lack of it) affect the demand for cooperation?   4. Under what conditions may conflict reduce rather than exacerbate vulnerabilities?    5. What constitutes the capacity of states and their institutions and other organizations to implement change, or even radical change necessary under times of stress?   6. What interventions might be suitable for reducing risks and improving human security associated  with  climate  and  water  related  stressors,  either  by  reducing  the vulnerability  of  the  system  and  increasing  its  adaptive  capacity  or  by modifying  the hazards?   7. Under  what  conditions  might  policies  of  adaptation  to  perceived  or  experienced climate  change  impacts  increase  the vulnerability of  some groups and/or exacerbate social conflict?    Tables  1  and  2  show  a  list  of  the  research  outputs  from  the  different  work  packages  with  an indication  of  which  areas  of  the  framework  they  addressed  (Table  1)  and  which  of  the  seven research questions their research is relevant to (Table 2). The next section reviews the findings of these papers, in particular drawing out their theoretical implications, and is organised by the seven research questions identified above. 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Table 1.  Mapping CLICO papers onto Conceptual Framework 
 
       
  7 
Table 2.  Mapping CLICO papers onto the conceptual framework suggested questions 




 In this section we review the outputs from the CLICO research from work package 2 (twelve case studies of hot spots of hydro‐climatic stress and human insecurity) and from work package 3 (large N  statistical  study  of  domestic  water  events),  work  package  4  (analysis  of  national  and international policies) and work package 5 (analysis of transboundary river basin agreements and adaptive capacity).   We draw out  the  theoretical  implications of  these studies by addressing    the research questions posed in the previous section .  
1. How  is  human  security  affected  by  risks  associated  with  water  and  climate­related 
stressors, societal vulnerability and social­political factors?    The  outputs  of  the  CLICO  research  support  the  premise  that  human  security  is  multi‐faceted (UNDP, 1994) and influenced by a range of social‐political, economic and environmental factors. To answer the above question we first  look at the different  factors that are  identified  in some of the CLICO case studies and their relative  importance (Question 1a), and then examine whether there are any indications as to how these factors might amplify each other (Question 1b).   
1 a) What  is the relative  importance of environmental risks compared to social and political 
factors?  
 Kallis  and  Zografos  (2012)  suggest  that  it  is  important  to  understand  that  there  is  no  definitive causal relation between an individual’s security and a particular aspect of their environment. They also  note  that  separating  the  effects  of  hydro‐climatic  variables  from  other  factors  can  be problematic  (Kallis  and  Zografos,  2012).  Instead,  they  suggest  that  it  is  more  useful  to  identify factors that tend to dominate under different socio‐environmental conditions and contexts, as has been done in the CLICO case studies, as we illustrate here.   One  of  the  CLICO  case  studies  examined  the  Intercontinental  Biosphere  Reserve  of  the Mediterranean (IBRM) in Morocco and Spain (Pascual et al., 2012). These two countries, operating under  very  different  political  and  institutional  environments,  cooperate  to  secure  the  region’s environmental  and  cultural  diversity.  Increasing  socio‐economic  pressure  in  tandem  with  a growing  population  and  decrease  in  water  availability  due  to  regional  climate  variability  and climate change are exposing the local residents to an even more water‐scarce environment in the future.   Transboundary  tensions  and  political  and  social  conflicts  and  uncertainties  in  the  Palestinian Territories combined with capacity constraints are thought to be major factors in shaping the risks to  human  security  posed  by  inadequate  access  to  water  (Tamimi  and  Abu  Jamous,  2012).  For example, Tamimi and Abu Jamous (2012) state that the average renewable water supply per capita in the Palestinian Territories is 500m3 a year, but that due to Israel’s claims on much of this water, 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Reviewing  the  relevant  literature,  Kallis  and  Zografos  (2012)  explain  that  human  security  is considered  to  be more  closely  related  to  economic  prosperity  and  political  freedom  rather  than environmental pressure. However, studies so far have yet to  investigate in depth the relationship between  socio‐economic  elements  and  security.  Results  from  the  CLICO  case  studies  shed  some light  on  possible mechanisms  by which  the  social,  political,  economic  and  environment  contexts interact to amplify risks and vulnerabilities, as illustrated below.  Snorek  et  al.  (2012)  suggest  that  social  vulnerabilities  are  related  to  issues  of  social  justice  and human rights and that social marginalisation can exacerbate vulnerability to climate stresses and 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human  insecurity. This  is  exemplified  in  several of  the  case  studies  including  those  conducted  in Niger (Snorek et al., 2012), Turkey (Turhan, 2012) and Ethiopia (Milman and Arsano, 2012).  Turhan  (2012)  explains  how  social  and  political  changes  during  the  post‐war  20th  Century, including  conflict  in  the  late  1980s  between  Kurdish  insurgents  and  the  Turkish  army,  led  to dispossession  of  the  rural  population  and  the  creation  of  a migrant  labour  force  in  Turkey.  The human insecurity of this population is due to its social and economic marginalisation in a neoliberal era  which  results  in  few  employment  rights  and  poor  living  conditions,  increasing  their vulnerability  to  climate  impacts.  The  seasonal  migrant  agricultural  labourers  are  vulnerable  to market  price  fluctuations  and  social marginalisation  as well  as  the  impacts  of  climate  variability and change. Climate  impacts  include delays  to  the harvest or poor harvests and  flood damage  to their temporary accommodation which have impacts on health and economic well‐being (Turhan, 2012).   Milman and Arsano (2012) describe a range of factors influencing human security in the region of Gambella  in Ethiopia,  including existing tensions between and within different ethnic groups that have  involved  violence,  as  well  as  food  insecurity,  poor  service  provision  and  vulnerability  to climate impacts.  Competition for land and water resources has resulted from population growth as well  as  displacement  of  populations  by  conflict,  and  in  some  areas  is  exacerbated  by  policy interventions by the state.  Given existing food insecurity and the vulnerability of the population to climate variability, Milman and Arsano (2012) describe climate change as a “multiplicative stressor meaning  that  even  small  biophysical  changes  could  exacerbate  existing  and  historically  rooted forms  of  human  insecurity,  particularly  if  changes  in  water  affect  land  use  either  via floods/droughts  or  if  climate  adaptation  policies  are  interpreted  as  incorporating  ethnic  biases.” (Milman and Arsano, 2012, p8).   Several  of  the  case  studies  explore  the  additional  risks  to  human  security  posed  by  societal 
responses to climate/water stresses, either for those who are responding/adapting or other social groups  negatively  affected  by  particular  responses/adaptation  actions  or  development  choices.  Snorek  et  al.  refer  to  this  as  ‘divergent  adaptation’, which  they define  as  “those  adaptations  that promote  the  success  or  adaptive  capacity  of  one  individual/community  (User  A)  in  a  shared ecosystem  which  leads  to  a  reduced  adaptive  capacity  of  an  alternative  individual/community (User B) in the same ecosystem” (Snorek et al., 2012, p6). For example, agro‐pastoralists in Niger have adapted to poor yields from unreliable rainfall by expanding croplands and seeking payment in  response  to  crop  damage  by  grazing  animals.  These  adaptations  have  lessened  the  adaptive capacity of pastoralists who find the area of grazing lands that they have access to have diminished and their expenses increased because they have to pay for crop damage by their herds (Snorek et al., 2012).  Other case studies highlight  the additional  risks posed by state  led adaptation responses  (Dalisa, 2012; Gebert et  al.,  2012; Milman and Arsano, 2012). For example, Gebert et  al.  (2012)  consider risks  to  human  security  arising  from  sea  level  rise  affecting  low  elevation  coastal  zones,  in particular  how  planned  relocation  in  response  to  risks  to  lives  and  livelihoods  changes  risks  to human security. They suggest  that relocation may reduce direct risks  from sea  level rise, such as danger from flooding, but expose people to new risks associated with displacement and removal of 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sustainable  livelihood  strategies.  Factors  influencing  potential  human  security  outcomes  include the  impact  of  relocation  on  household  asset  portfolios  and  structures,  and  the  preferences  and priorities  of  households  which  affect  the  decision  to  participate  in  planned  relocation.  The incentives  provided  for  relocation  are  also  important  and  are  influenced  by  the  capacity  of  the country  or  region  to  provide  conditions  for  sustainable  long  term  solutions.  A  key  influence  on human security outcomes is thought to be the degree of match between people’s preferences (such as  housing  requirements  and  livelihood  opportunities)  and  the  benefits  provided  by  planned adaptation programmes sponsored by the state (Albizua and Zografos, 2012; Gebert et al., 2012;).  D’Alisa  and  Kallis  (2012)  suggest  that  securitisation  of  issues  by  the  state  can  increase  human insecurity  associated  with  environmental  hazards  due  to  the  de‐politicisation  of  issues  and  the stifling  of  debate  around  alternative  disaster  response  and  adaptation  strategies.  By  declaring environmental disasters as a ‘state of emergency’, such as that caused by the mudslides in the Sarno incident  of  1998,  the  state  is  able  to  concentrate  on  responses  that  are  popularist  rather  than beneficial  to  long  term human  security  in  the wider  region.  Albizua  and  Zografos  (2012)  note  a similar  impact  of  securitisation  in  reducing  debate  in  their  Ebro  delta  case  study  (as  discussed under the next question).  The  role  of  adaptation  policies  in  enhancing  human  security  or  exacerbating  human  insecurities will be returned to under question 7. 
 
2. How  do  political,  economic,  environmental  and  climatic  factors  exacerbate  or  mitigate 
water­related conflict?  Kallis  and  Zografos  (2012)  and  Selby  and  Hoffman  (2012)  identify  a  number  of  studies  that postulate that water and climate conflict may result from either scarcity (Gleick, 1993) or an over abundance of water  resources  (Fairhead,  2001; Gleditsch  et  al.,  2006). However,  CLICO  research questions any direct link between hydro‐climatic influences and conflict and offers a wide range of examples  that  illustrate  the  multiplicity  of  political,  economic,  social  and  other  factors  that influence conflict.   Böhmelt  et  al.  (2012)  analyse  time‐series  cross‐section  data  pertaining  to  10,352  water‐related events in 35 countries in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Sahel from 1997‐2009 derived from a database of media articles of domestic water related events (Bernauer et al., 2012). They explore the extent to which demand for water (measured using indictors for GDP, population density and agricultural productivity),  supply  (measured using  indicators of  climate variability) and  restraint (institutional  characteristics  that  may  deter  violence  or  conflict  in  general)  determine  whether interactions over water are conflictive or cooperative and the intensity of conflict or cooperation. The authors find that changes in water demand (affected primarily by economic development) and restraint  factors  influence  domestic  water‐related  interactions  more  than  supply  variations. Increased  water  demand  (predicted  by  higher  economic  development)  is  associated  with  an increase  in  low‐level conflict over water. Böhmelt et al.  (2012) propose that economic prosperity and  political  freedom  in  democratic  countries  may  allow  ‘political  space’  for  disputes,  whereas violent conflicts are far more common in non‐democratic environments than democratic ones.  Low level conflict in democracies may contribute over time to consensus building processes that could 
       
  12 
be described as cooperation, hence there can be potential overlap between cooperation and conflict in decision making processes.   Tamimi  and  Jamous  (2012)  describe  how  existing  insecurities  due  to  political  conflict  and  poor access to water increase the vulnerability of the population in Palestine. They conclude that climate change in the West Bank will not only impact human security but also strengthen the likelihood of conflict between different social groups in the region. Bar‐On and Gerstetter (2012) describe how different  narratives  on  the  Israeli  and  Palestinian  side  make  it  difficult  to  reach  agreement  on water‐related issues between both sides.   Fischhendler and Katz (2012) examine the influence of different sources of uncertainty,  including political, social and environmental uncertainties, on the degree of cooperation or conflict associated with  negotiations  over  transboundary  water  resources  shared  between  Israel  and  Palestine.  By examining documents related to a series of bilateral and trilateral negotiations held between 2007 and  2009  between  Israeli,  Palestinian  and  US  negotiators,  they  find  that  political  and  social uncertainties dominate over physical uncertainties such as those associated with water resources and climate variability. However,  they also found that uncertainties of one type can  ‘spill‐over’  to impact  on  water  uncertainties.  For  example  political  uncertainties  can  threaten  successful negotiations on water issues. The type of persons involved in the negotiations (whether politicians or  technical  officials)  and  the  type  of  cooperative  mechanisms  proposed  also  influenced  the outcome  in  terms  of  increased  cooperation  or  conflict:  legal  mechanisms  were  more  likely  to receive  objections  from  the  parties  compared  to  mechanisms  such  as  exchange  of  information.  However,  mechanisms  to  address  uncertainties  were  often  cooperative  on  the  surface,  e.g. feasibility studies, but may have been intended to delay resolution rather than resolve differences.   Some measures  to  reduce physical uncertainty brought up new social and political uncertainties, acting  as  additional  barriers  to  cooperation.  An  example  that  the  authors  cite  is  the  building  of desalination  infrastructure  by  Israel,  which  reduces  the  incentive  for  Israel  to  cooperate  since shared water resources become less important as a result of this new source of water. This example is also picked up by Gerstetter et al (2012) who found that in some cases mutual threats to human security  from  water  related  risks  can  instigate  cooperation  (for  example  a  joint  sewage management  initiative  for Nicosia  in Cyprus reduced the threat  to  the population  from untreated sewage), whilst  in others,  certain policies and resolution mechanisms  that aim to  lessen risk and conflict, sometimes trigger new disputes, for example desalination in Israel.  Using a case study of Sudan and South Sudan, Selby and Hoffman (2012) argue that processes and structures at multiple scales from the local to that of the global political economy are responsible for shaping the nature of the state’s agency. They assert that the evidence for Sudan suggests that it is  the  historical  context  and  current  shape  of  the  state  and  actions  of  its  agents  that  influence conflict  as  well  as  contributing  to  environmental  vulnerabilities,  rather  than  any  scarcity  of resources imposed by environmental change. However, they find that the existing situation of high 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insecurity,  as well  as  changing  economic  conditions  due  to  a  drop  in  oil  revenues2,  hampers  the ability to create capacity to respond to potential climate and water related stresses.   According to Snorek et al.  (2012) water‐related conflict  in Niger stems from the existing political and  economic  context.  Snorek  et  al  (2012)  suggest  that  conflict  is  a  political  response  to marginalization of certain groups’ livelihood needs over others, a response that is exacerbated by environmental change.  While institutions at multiple scales can either ease or compound ongoing latent  conflicts/disputes  between  divergent  groups,  corruption,  low  accountability  and  low  trust inhibit  individuals  from  seeking  solutions  through  institutions.    In  the Niger  context,  individuals exposed  to  both  resource  scarcity  and  a  lack  of  institutional mechanisms  to  support  livelihoods turn to conflict to establish control over assets or entitlements.  In  contrast,  Turhan  (2012)  describes  how  lack  of  organisation  and  union membership  amongst seasonal  migrant  workers  in  Turkey  “hinders  the  possible  emergence  of  class‐based  conflicts” (p21)  between  workers  and  their  employers  in  an  era  of  changing  agricultural  systems  of production.    Albizua  and  Zografos  (2012)  describe  differing  perceptions  amongst  those  affected  and  decision makers regarding the need to adapt to threats to water resources in the Ebro river delta including salinisation, subsidence, sea  level rise and the  impacts of water  transfers. Perceptions differ with proximity to the problem and the level of knowledge of the delta system. Conflict between actors is not overt and these differences in perceptions do not feed fully into debate on possible responses. Although scientific knowledge  is key  for dealing with vulnerability drivers,  the authors point out that an overemphasis on expert  scientific knowledge and arguments  that emphasise  the  security implications  of  the  risks  facing  the  delta,  risk  a  closing  down  of  the  debate  that  perpetuates inequalities between groups. Hence, they identify a persisting  “ “fear” of being disposed of water” (Albizua and Zografos, 2012, p15) in spite of state‐led adaptation attempts. They draw on the point made by Zeitoun and Warner (2006) that “silent conflicts” are often caused by excessive water use, transfer or contamination by hydro‐hegemonic actors.    Milman  and  Arsano  (2012)  describe  multiple  linkages  between  conflict  and  political,  economic, environmental and climatic  factors  for  the Gambella region of Ethiopia. Conflict has  long been an outcome  of  competition  for  land  and  water  resources  between  different  ethnic  groups,  often exacerbated by contested state‐led policies, such as resettlement programs. Although there is little evidence  for  climatic  factors  directly  influencing  conflict,  current  policies  designed  to  reduce vulnerability to climate stresses, amongst other aims, give preference to some aspects of security over  others,  creating  new  insecurities  and  influences  on  conflict  potential.  This  preference  for addressing  some aspects of  security over others  “both  results  from and  influences  socio‐political interactions in the region” (Milman and Arsano, 2012, p12).  
                                                        
2 Sudan  lost  two thirds of  its oil  resources when the south seceded  in  July 2011, but retained processing and export facilities. Disagreements between Sudan and South Sudan led to south Sudan stopping oil production in January 2012, reducing the income of both countries (BBC news, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐africa‐1968670). 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3. How does human security (or lack of it) affect the demand for cooperation? 
 This  question  was  relatively  under  developed  in  the  CLICO  research  since  direct  links  between human  (in)security  and  cooperation  were  few.    In  the  western  Mediterranean,  hydro‐climatic change is expected to bring further human insecurities. To help mitigate for these changes, Morocco and  Spain  have  created  a  reserve  across  the Basin,  bringing  cooperation  between  two  countries that otherwise may not have worked together (Pascual et al., 2012). Other instances of cooperation were  documented  by  Gerstetter  et  al.  (2012)  between  the  Greek  Cypriot  and  Turkish  Cypriot communities,  who  cooperate  over  sewage  treatment  works  on  the  island  of  Cyprus,  whilst  the authors  also  noted  the  potential  for  collaboration  between  Israel,  Jordan  and  Palestine  if  the Red/Dead Sea Canal is approved. Cooperation may be related to a complex range of historical and political  influences,  and  it  is  not  clear  how  much  concerns  over  human  security  influence cooperation in these examples.   Although  some  literature  supports  the  theory  of  mutually  beneficial  cooperation  (Zeitoun  and Warner, 2006), others believe that some kinds of collaboration may only seek to reinforce unequal situations  (Albizua  and Zografos,  2012).  Some  actors  in  the Ebro delta  study  expressed  a  strong aversion to uncertainty which was connected with support for state intervention and the use of the precautionary  principle  (Albizua  and  Zografos,  2012).  However,  those who were most  aware  of threats  to  their  human  security,  because  of  a  perceived  inequality  in  the  distribution  of environmental  impacts,  feared  the  impact  upon  them  of  actions  purporting  to  be  ‘cooperative’ (such  as water  transfers)  and  rejected  the  possibility  of  losing  their  coastal  land  in  the  spirit  of cooperation. Moreover,  those actors who strongly  favoured technological solutions such as dikes, had little faith in the capacity of public policy to overcome powerful interests and provide adequate solutions for their security (Albizua and Zografos, 2012).   Fischhendler and De Bruyne (2012) suggest that choosing to cooperate in the face of conflict often is  determined  more  by  transaction  costs3  rather  than  any  environmental  variability  or  an individual’s adaptive capacity. Unilateral measures by Israel such as building desalination plants to increase water security have possibly acted  to reduce  Israel’s  incentive  to cooperate over shared water resources (Fischhendler and Katz, 2012).  
 
4. Under what conditions may conflict reduce rather than exacerbate vulnerabilities?  Kallis and Zografos (2012) explain that conflict is a multi‐faceted social phenomenon, which under certain circumstances (e.g. oppressive situations) can even be beneficial, help reduce vulnerability and improve adaptive capacity. For example “Adaptive” conflicts between herders and farmers in the Western Sahel have pushed for political change and State action to  legitimize mobility, a vital adaptation  strategy  for  drought‐hit  herders  (Turner  2004).  Conflict  cannot  be  reduced  to international and civil war only, i.e. conceived only at the nation‐state level (which is often the case in  the  literature  on  climate  security)  as  it  frequently  occurs  at  sub‐national  scales  ranging  from                                                         
3 Fischhendler and De Bruyne  (2012) describe  transaction costs  in  this  context as  the expense borne by negotiating parties in terms of political, monitoring and enforcement costs associated with negotiating and implementing conflict resolution mechanisms in treaties.  
       
  15 
inter‐communal  conflict down  to  the household scale. Another distinction  involves armed versus social or political  conflicts  that do not  involve death‐threatening violence,  such as disagreements and disputes (Kallis and Zografos, 2012).   It  has  been  argued  that  conflict  can  coexist  with  cooperation  and  even  prompt  cooperation (Keohane,  2005;  Zeitoun  and  Mirumachi,  2008).  Evidence  for  this  arises  from  some  of  the transboundary  scale CLICO  studies.  Fischhendler  and Katz  (2012)  show  that different  sources of uncertainty  could  provoke  cooperation  in  negotiations  over  transboundary  water  management between  Israel  and  Palestine,  but  that  political  constraints  remained.  In  their  review  of international water  treaties Fischhendler and De Bruyne (2012) examine the adoption of conflict resolution mechanisms. They find that, by confronting underlying issues that otherwise may never have been raised or addressed, conflict resolution mechanisms in transboundary agreements have the potential to take into account future uncertainty, improve flexibility, impose commitments and address potential disputes (Fischhendler and De Bruyne, 2012).   At a sub‐national scale D’Alisa and Kallis (2012) suggest that the silencing of political debate and conflict (dissent) over response strategies to environmental hazards by a hegemonic state leads to negative  human  security  outcomes  in  the  case  of  Sarno,  Italy,  since  long  term  vulnerability  to landslide hazards remains high in the region. This implies that a level of political conflict, including dissension and debate (rather than violent conflict) can provide positive conditions for a full range of adaptive responses to be considered.   
5. What  constitutes  the  capacity  of  states  and  their  institutions  and  other  organizations  to 
implement change, or even radical change necessary under times of stress??  Coordination  across  institutions  is  emphasised  by Milman  et  al  (2012), who  assess  the  adaptive capacity of transboundary river basin institutions to climate change using an indicators approach. They  assert  that  adaptive  capacity  is  determined  more  by  an  actor’s  ability  to  communicate, cooperate and coordinate  rather  than any  financial,  technical or human resources.   They suggest that  climate  change  adaptation  in  a  transboundary  river  basin  will  not  only  be  determined  by international  institutional  capacity  but  also  national  and  sub‐national  abilities  to  cooperate  at different  scales    (Milman  et  al.,  2012).  Furthermore,  Milman  et  al.  suggest  that  effective transboundary  institutions  also  tend  to  have  a  greater  capacity  to  develop  adaptation  strategies (Kranz et al., 2010). Milman et al.  (2012)  investigated  the  influence of a  ‘weak  link’  (a basin  that contains  a  nation  with much  lower  adaptive  capacity  than  other  nations  in  the  basin)  on  basin adaptive capacity and found that it was not a strong influence.  Through  the  creation  of  a  common  protected  area  (IBRM),  institutions  from  Spain  and Morocco have  been  working  together  on  the  creation  of  a  common  framework  to  foster  sustainable territorial development and improve management of water resources in the region (Abdul Malak et al.  2012).  The  cooperation  channel  generated  between  both  countries  has  led  to  the  increase  of stability, security and sustainable development within the region.  However,  some  elements  are  still  considered  as  a  barrier  for  an  effective  management  of  the Reserve,  namely  the  weak  implementation  of  current  laws  and  policies,  duplication  among 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institutions  and  the  low  levels  of  public  participation  and  absence  of  co‐responsibility  of  the population in water management (Abdul Malak et al. 2012).  The example of Niger shows that institutions can either enhance cooperation or hinder it. In some cases  the  customary  hierarchical  institutions  were  found  to  enhance  cooperation  but  in  others corruption  and  social  marginalisation  or  entrenched  social  biases  and  inequities  promote institutions that are destructive and increase the potential for conflict (Snorek et al., 2012). In this type  of  environment,  mechanisms  need  to  be  in  place  to  minimise  policies  and  norms  that encourage inequitable solutions. At the same time, institutions must be held accountable and rules must be enforced to ensure repeat mistakes are avoided (Snorek et al., 2012).  
 In  Egypt,  where  sea  level  rise  may  require  relocation  policies  to  be  implemented,  actors  are currently  operating  under  uncertain  conditions  with  the  country  still  recovering  from  a  civil uprising. As a result, institutions are unable to fully address the inherent complexities that need to be understood to plan and manage such adaptive measures effectively (Gebert et al., 2012). Snorek et al. (2012) emphasize that to frame adaptation actions effectively, systems need to be able to cope with  high  uncertainty  whilst  still  being  dynamic  enough  to  adapt  if  conditions  change  (Ostrom, 2005; Pahl‐Wostl, 2009).   Institutional  and  infrastructural  gaps,  such  as  poor  access  to  reliable  data,  contribute  to  poor environmental management and human  insecurity  in  the Sudan case study (Selby and Hoffmann, 2012).   Sudan and South Sudan’s future ability to cope with hydro‐climatic stresses depends on a strengthening of  state  institutions.  South Sudanese  institutions have only  recently  emerged  from conflict and have to adjust to the newly won independence of the young republic. North Sudanese state institutions, on the other hand, suffer from a high level of personalisation and politicisation of the bureaucracy. With more effective and accountable state actors, more universal access to justice may  contribute  to  the  avoidance  of  future  conflict  associated  with  adaptation  and  development planning  (Selby  and  Hoffmann,  2012).  This  vision  is  in  stark  contrast  to  experience  of implementation of recent and past development initiatives such as the construction of the Merowe dam and reports of leasing of land and water to Foreign Direct Investors that although potentially transformative,  have  indications  of  exploitation  and  exacerbation  of  social  conflict  (e.g.  Deng, 2011).    Milman  and  Arsano  (2012)  point  out  that  the  nation  state  is  conceived  of  as  the  institution responsible  for  climate  change  adaptation  planning  by  the  international  community,  under  the UNFCCC.  However,  they  question  the  role  of  the  state  and  state‐led  societal  transformation  in adaptation.  They  raise  concerns  over  transformative  agendas  for  adaptation,  describing  how  the state‐led agendas for transforming agriculture and livelihoods in Gambella, Ethiopia, value certain lifestyles and aspects of human security over others and take time to implement. Thus notions of transformation  for  adaptation  raise  questions  of  “who  and  what  is  prioritized  and  how  such determinations are made” (Milman and Arsano, p18).   Vidaurre  and  Tedsen  (2012)  observe  that  policy  actors  and  actors  interviewed  were  relatively satisfied  with  the  adaptation‐related  policy  frameworks  in  Ethiopia,  criticising  only  a  lack  of implementation  of  the  relatively  recently  adopted  policies  on  the  ground.  Milman  and  Arsano 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(2012) go on to explain how the capacity of the government to implement adaptations influences which  adaptations  are  prioritized.  For  example,  reducing  risk  from  flooding  by  resettling populations is more achievable and has additional benefits to the government compared to the high technical  and  capital  requirements  needed  to  reduce  threats  to  livelihoods  from  insufficient  and erratic rainfall.   Milman and Arsano (2012) ask “how can traditional societies adapt to climate change” in a context where the state promotes agricultural modernization in order to meet development and adaptation needs?      Their  research  explains  how  state  development  and  adaptation  policies  in  Gambella, Ethiopia are founded upon a view of traditional livelihoods as ‘backward’ and a barrier to economic  growth.  This  view  fails  to  recognise  that  the mobility  involved  in  traditional  livelihoods  such  as flood plain recession agriculture, pastoralism, shifting cultivation and harvesting of forest products provide a source of resilience to climate variability.   Dalby  (2012)  maintains  that  individuals  and  communities  exposed  to  hazards  can  become  too dependent  on  state  institutions,  reducing  their  independent  adaptive  capacity.  Strong  popular support for state  interventions from those affected by disasters  is  illustrated by the case study of the Sarno basin in Italy where a series of mudslides resulted in a humanitarian disaster (D’Alisa and Kallis  2012).  The  authors  describe  how  a    massive  scale  intervention  by  the  state  provided protection  to  those  individuals who  had  been  affected  but  failed  to  solve  the  root  causes  of  the devastation and left other areas just as at risk as before. The response ensured continued support for government in the area but failed to deliver radical change and protect human security, leaving much of the population at risk of the same thing happening to them in the future. D’Alisa and Kallis (2012) suggest  that  the populist and neo‐liberal approach of  the government, combined with the use of states of emergency to govern, result in a silencing of political debate and a reduced capacity to protect the human security of the population.  In some cases, actors must implement change without external assistance from the state or through co‐operation  with  other  actors.  Charalambous  et  al.  (2012)  found  that  in  Cyprus,  which  has experienced  a  number  of  severe  droughts  over  the  past  two  decades,  80%  of  the  51  tourist accommodation businesses that responded to their survey had installed at least one water saving device and 90% had encouraged water  saving habits  through staff  training or notices  for guests. Weaver (2011), however, describes how there is little incentive or pressure to alter operations in the tourist  industry and refers to water savings notices as being motivated by economic benefits. The  survey  also  indicated  that  there  was  little  awareness  in  the  tourism  sector  about  climate change and its potential impacts, indicating that the relevant government authorities have not yet involved them in adaptation planning (Charalambous et al. 2012). 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6. What  interventions might  be  suitable  for  reducing  risks  and  improving  human  security 
associated with climate and water related stressors, either by reducing the vulnerability of 
the system and increasing its adaptive capacity or by modifying the hazards?  Kallis  and  Zografos  (2012)  draw  attention  to  the  conspicuous  absence  from  the  literature  of  a discussion  of  the  role  that  can  be  played  by  older  notions  of  civil  security/protection  as well  as social  security,  which  were  central  in  water  hazard  prevention  and  response  debates4.  This  is important  because  the  basic  functions  of  social  security  and  the  welfare  state  are  relevant  for human  security.  Subsidised  access  to health  services,  state  support  for  those who  lose homes or work (e.g. after a hydro‐climatic disaster), immigrant reception and integration, are all policies that help  reduce  the  social  vulnerability  of  disadvantaged  groups.  Those  notions  count  with  long‐established  institutions  for  their  delivery:  civil  security/protection  agencies  are  still  in  charge  of flood prevention,  emergency and  reconstruction and  therefore have an  important  role  to play  in ensuring human security. While climate change could comprise a powerful rationale for extending social and civil security systems in developing and emerging economies, what we instead evidence in  recent  years  is  the  retreat  of  such  security‐enhancing  arrangements  even  in  developed economies. This, it could be argued, has increased vulnerabilities and related insecurities – though this question has not been studied.  Currently,  policies  explicitly  designed  to  tackle  the  linkages  between  hydro  climatic  stressors, human security and conflict can mainly be found at the international or EU level (Gerstetter et al., 2012).  However,  the  CLICO  studies  provide  lessons  for  policies  and  interventions  at  a  range  of scales from the transboundary to the sub‐national.   At the international river basin level, Milman et al. (2012) develop a typology of river basins which points  to  how  interventions  to  bolster  adaptive  capacity will  be more  effective  if  tailored  to  the nature of the relationships within the basin.   Moreover, Milman et al. explain how adaptation is a process  and  that  building  adaptive  capacity  includes  not  only  building  the  resources  and knowledge  to  address  climate  change  but  also  a  pathway  through  which  these  resources  can translate into action.      Fischhendler  and  Katz  (2012)  suggest  restructuring  negotiations  to  avoid  barriers  to transboundary  water  cooperation  caused  by  linkage  and  spill‐over  between  different  unrelated policies. They suggest separating the roles of politicians and technical professionals and leaving the latter  group  to  negotiate  on  technical  details  at  the  end  of  the  negotiations.  Tamimi  and  Jamous (2012)  suggest  that  both  national  and  transboundary  IWRM  plans  should  be  able  to  integrate climate change adaptation measures in the future, building confidence across all spatial scales.  Albizua and Zografos (2012) remind us that for interventions to be effective, there needs to be joint action at all spatial scales, but also uncoordinated changes need to take place at the household level (Paavola and Adger, 2006) and individuals need to be incorporated into climate change adaptation policy making  (Renn  and  Schweizer,  2009).  Adger  (2010)  asserts  that  any  adaptive  response  to environmental  change  is  determined  by  the  values  attached  to  the  questions  being  asked.  For                                                         
4 For an exception see: Heltberg et al. 2009. 
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instance, what might be worth preserving for one person, might not be for another. This is in line with the recognition of the importance of representation and voice, equity and fair distribution of risk for adaptation and human security (Adger 2010, in Turhan 2012).  The link between planned large scale interactions and the values and responses of individuals, households and communities is a theme that many of the CLICO studies explore further.   Albizua and Zografos (2012) suggest that without a basic understanding of a value‐based approach, policies and  interventions can often result  in maladaptive responses, as  the Alexandria, Gambella and Seyhan case  studies  illustrate  (Gebert et al. 2012; Milman and Arsano, 2012; Turhan, 2012). Turhan suggests that the “things, places and ideas” valued by marginalized and highly vulnerable social groups, such as seasonal migrant agricultural laborers in Turkey, need to be taken account of in adaptation interventions in order to have any chance of improving their wellbeing and reducing vulnerability.    Similarly,  Gebert  et  al.  (2012)  explain  how  the  relocation  needs,  priorities  and preferences of  vulnerable groups  in Alexandria,  such as  those working  in  the agricultural  sector, need to be acknowledged  in relocation policy to ensure human security and avoid maladaptation when it comes to livelihood reorganization.    Drawing  on  evidence  from  the  Ebro  delta  case  study,  Albizua  and  Zografos  (2012)  propose  that acknowledging people’s  values and perceptions of  climate  change  should be  seen as  an essential component of the policy making process. They also call for more dialogue, debate, and deliberation between  those  involved  in managing and benefiting  from  the  region’s  resources  to address  their differing perceptions. They recognize a point made by O’Brien and Wolf (2010) that an individual’s response  to  climate  change  is  determined  to  a  large  extent  by  how  their  specific  well‐being  is impacted.   Albizua  and Zografos  (2012)  illustrate  this by  showing  that  the  views of people most affected  by  threats  to  the Ebro  delta  in  Spain  had different  perceptions  of  adaptation  options  to those  decision  makers  who  were  more  distant.  They  suggest  differing  values  and  perceptions, beyond  those  associated  with  scientific  knowledge  and  economics,  should  be  addressed  using deliberative decision making processes, which they nevertheless acknowledge are themselves open to  the  influence  of  power  of  dominant  actors  and  discourses.  Value‐based  approaches  can  help understand the limits of adaptation, whilst at the same time discern how value prioritizations are controlled by those with political power (O'Brien and Wolf, 2010, in Albizua and Zografos 2012).   Pascual  et  al.  (2012)  also  emphasise  the need  for  greater  public  participation  and  integration  of local  knowledge  into  the  development  of  interventions.  They  suggest  as  an  example,  giving  the population  a  feeling  of  co‐responsibility  for  the management  of  a  resource  such  as  a  river.  They consider  that  the  current  institutional  capacity  of  the  IBRM  in  the  Morocco‐Spain  case  study  is sufficient to maintain human security even with future climatic and social changes, however efforts need to be made to implement current laws.    Gerstetter  et  al.  2012  emphasize  that  state  interventions  often  influence  the  conditions  under which  individuals  or  communities  can  adapt  (e.g.  through  setting  legal  frameworks  or  providing funding) and are therefore a necessary part of adaptation efforts at large. However, the Niger case study  (Snorek  et  al.  2012)  illustrates  the  need  for  institutional  appropriateness  when  trying  to reduce  vulnerabilities  and  maintain  adaptive  capacity.  Such  interventions  can  respond  to  both 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human and environmental processes, involve structural or behavioural outcomes, occur at different time scales and either protect, maintain actions or alter a situation completely (Snorek et al. 2012).  Gebert et al. (2012) examined the potential  for forced or planned relocation in Alexandria, Egypt. Their  results  showed  that  this  type  of  intervention  has  been  relatively  unexplored  from  an international policy perspective (Warner, 2011) and been mainly viewed as a “last resort” option. Although challenges exist regarding possible trade‐offs, sustainability and security issues, Gebert et al.  (2012)  believe  these  can  be  overcome  if  integrated  into  previous  and  existing  institutional frameworks.    They  suggest  three  criteria  for  successful  planned  migration  interventions.  First, planned relocation is a must for those without the means to migrate themselves. Second, programs need to adopt a long term outlook on potential migrants that addresses the sustainability of their livelihoods and policies need adjusting now so  that sustainable relocation can be achieved  in  the future.  Finally,  tailor‐made  incentives  are  needed  to  target  specific  groups  of  people,  given  their income source and level.  Finally,  Albizua  and  Zografos  (2012)  recommend  that  policies  of  adaptation  should  take  into account not only the direct effects of climate change but also any other indirect processes that risk exacerbating  these  impacts,  such  as  the  downstream  implications  of  expansion  of  large  scale irrigation, for example.   
7. Under what  conditions might  policies  of  adaptation  to  perceived  or  experienced  climate 
change  impacts  increase  the  vulnerability  of  some  groups  and/or  exacerbate  social 
conflict? 
 Snorek et al. (2012) recognize that in some cases, adaptation policies reinforce social hierarchies in society (Adger et al., 2009). They refer to work by Engle (2011) who suggests that inequalities are can  be  due  to weak  institutions  that  are  unable  to  effectively  determine who  is most  in  need  of adaptive  resources.  According  to  Snorek  et  al  (2012)  this  relationship  between  adaptation  to climate change and social justice is underappreciated.   There  is  some  evidence  in  the  CLICO  case  studies  for  tensions  or  conflict  arising  as  a  result  of unequal effects of adaptations amongst different social groups, who might differ in their values. For example, perceptions of uneven distribution of benefits and  the negative  impacts of  responses  to threats  to water  resources  in  the Ebro delta were particularly  strong  amongst  those who  feared losing access to water (Albizua and Zografos, 2012). Albizua and Zografos (2012) go on to say that where policies are subject to the influence of economic and scientific arguments as well as power relations there is a risk that the debate on policy alternatives and their uneven impact is stifled.  Vidaurre  and  Tedsen  (2012)  identify  instances  in  Ethiopia  where  state‐led  adaptation  policies further antagonised actors who were already critical towards the state. Milman and Arsano (2012) examine two key policies designed for economic development and adaptation to climate variability in Gambella, Ethiopia: the Villagization Program and Agricultural Development Led Industrialization. They show how these policies are founded upon a view that simply agricultural modernization will transform  societies,  provide  increased  food  security  and  reduce  poverty  and  vulnerability  to climate  hazards.  However,  by  prioritising  some  aspects  of  security  over  others,  these  programs 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have  led  to declines  in human security  for  the affected population, at  least  in  the short  term. For example, by moving people out of the flood plain to permanent settlements they have reduced their vulnerability to floods but increased their vulnerability to water scarcity, given the erratic rainfall in Gambella that is likely to increase with climate change. They also show how these policies have facilitated  the allocation of  land  for new settlers and agricultural  investors,  thereby exacerbating the existing tensions in the region, resulting in a recent rise in violence.    Turhan  (2012)  shows  how  state‐led  adaptation  policies  in  Turkey  aimed  at  capacity  building, focused  on  diversification  and  engagement  in  the  market  economy,  combined  with  ‘charitable’ interventions on behalf of  the  state  to  improve  living  conditions of  seasonal migrant agricultural workers,  shift  the  responsibility  of  adaptation  to  the  individual.  By  prescribing  overly  simplistic adaptation  solutions,  Turhan  suggests  that  the  state  “aims  at  making  vulnerable  groups  legible, simplified, homogenous and thus governable” (Turhan, p22). He also shows how these policies and interventions do nothing to respond to the values and perceived adaptation needs of the migrant workers themselves nor do they alter the structural conditions responsible for their vulnerability. He  argues  that  this  renders  them  ‘invisible’  to  the  state,  maintaining  their  marginal  position  in society.  Snorek et al. (2012) suggest that multiple institutions and actors with differing objectives, have the potential  to  lessen  the  vulnerability  of  one  group  or  individual,  but  simultaneously  cause  a reduction  in  the adaptive capacity of another  (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). For example,  in Niger, the  expansion  of  arable  farming  as  an  adaptive  strategy  has  put  greater  stress  on  pastoral livelihoods  in  the  region  (Snorek  et  al.  2012).  Another  example  comes  from  the Alexandria  case study, where Gebert et al.  (2012) suggest  that poorly planned relocation would  inevitably create significant  insecurities  for the non‐migrant population, reducing their capacity to adapt.    In these examples, one group’s adaptive success reduces the adaptive capacity of another group in society, a social  phenomena  which  Snorek  et  al.  (2012)  refer  to  as  divergent  adaptation.  By  increasing awareness of divergent adaptation Snorek et al.  (2012) suggest  that  it  is possible  to  improve  the effectiveness of institutional capacities and promote collaboration between those who benefit from adaptation and those who suffer.  The high  level of  conflict  and  insecurity  in  the Sudans has a  large  impact on  the ability  to put  in place  development  and  adaptation  plans.  However,  as  Selby  and Hoffman  (2012)  stress,  conflict and environmental degradation  issues need  to be examined  in  the context of a history of neglect and  exploitation  associated with  the  nature  of  state  agency,  which  should  be  seen  as  a  process resulting  from agents and structures at  the  local, national and global scale. Therefore, adaptation that  is  planned  and  implemented  by  the  state must  also  be  seen  in  this  context.  This  raises  the likelihood of adaptation being both shaped by and contributing to the conflict in the region.    Due  to  the  existing  high  level  of  conflict  and  insecurity,  climate  change  adaptation  is  not  an immediate  concern  to  policy  makers  in  either  Sudan  or  South  Sudan.  However  planning  for adaptation has begun at least on paper in Sudan, whilst South Sudan has little institutional capacity to deal with even the immediate challenges it faces such as provision of security, basic services and water management (Selby and Hoffmann, 2012). Selby and Hoffman (2012) suggest that adaptation to  the  decline  in  oil  revenue  by  Sudan’s  elite  is  to  be  achieved  by  intensification  of  irrigated 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commercial  agriculture  in  the  Nile  valley  (Verhoeven,  2011).  A  strategy  such  as  this  may  risk additional conflict at the sub‐national scale due to land appropriation and displacement of people, as  has  happened  in  the  past  (Selby  and  Hoffman  2012).  There  would  also  be  implications  for transboundary tensions over Nile water sharing  if Sudan reaches  its  full quota of water allocated under  the  1959  agreement,  as  it  plans  to  do.  This  complicates  potential  negotiations  over  Nile quotas  between  Sudan  and  South  Sudan,  since  South  Sudan  intends  to  pursue  its  own  plans  for irrigated agricultural expansion (Selby and Hoffman 2012).   
4. Revised theoretical framework   Figure 3 illustrates a revised conceptual framework that builds on existing and new understandings of hydro‐climatic  insecurity  from the CLICO studies.   This builds on the conceptual  framework  in Figure 2 and other  frameworks such as those of  the resilience of socio‐ecological systems (Folke, 2006) and framings of vulnerability around exposure and risk (Birkmann, 2006; Turner et al. 2003; Wisner et al. 2004).    Human (In‐) Security  is  shaped by cross‐scale dynamic processes of hydro‐climatic  stress  (water related climatic stresses), responses and adaptation within social ecological systems,  interactions (conflict  and  cooperation)  and  mutual  impacts.  The  concept  of  human  security  is  the  all encompassing concept  in  the new framework and can be measured at all  scales:  from global and regional down to national, social‐ecological systems, communities and  individuals. The  individual and community scale has been added since several of the CLICO studies emphasise the importance of actions and insecurities at this scale.  The  starting  point  of  the  framework  is  that  hydro‐climate  stresses  as  well  as  dynamic  socio‐ecological interactions at multiple scales are likely to influence exposure and vulnerability to water related  stressors.  This  is  indicated  by  the  circle  of  responses  and  impacts  in  the  framework represented by the two curved arrows.  Human security  is operationalized by using the concepts of exposure and vulnerability as well as adaptation  and  adaptive  capacity.  These  concepts  can  be  used  to  measure  the  state  of  human security by including all the social‐ecological interactions at multiple scales across all actors. Within the  adaptation  box  we  explicitly  suggest  various  actors/entities,  to  accommodate  the  range  of research  within  the  CLICO  project  that  focuses  variously  on  individuals,  communities  and institutions.  Adaptation  is  a  dynamic  process,  influenced  by  factors  at  various  scales,  including  institutions, power, perceptions, and culture,  the  last  two added because many CLICO case studies emphasize their importance. Responses to hydro‐climate stressors and insecurities ‐ such as adaptation ‐ are embedded in processes of socio‐ecological interactions where factors such as, power and interests, culture, perceptions, institutions, environmental conditions and social and economic relations play a role affecting the formation of adaptive capacity of different groups and actors and, consequently, the overall pathway of adaptation. 





Figure 3: Revised conceptual framework of hydro-security. (This diagram and the accompanying text in this 
section were drafted by project partners from the United Nations University: Niklas Gebert, Julia Kloos, Fabrice 
Renaud, and Julie Snorek).  Adaptation  outcomes/strategies  are  determined  by  the  way  adaptive  capacities  are  formed  and accumulated (strengthened or weakened) and then utilized by multiple actors leading to a diverse set of mutual impacts of adaptation. We introduce the concept of ‘divergent adaptation’ (Snorek et al.  2012)  into  the  framework  since  it  encapsulates  the  relationship  between  conflict  and cooperation, adaptation and adaptive capacity, where adaptation strategies can result  in different human security outcomes for different social groups or actors.   The origins of the term ‘divergent adaptation’ are in evolutionary biology, where it is defined as the accumulation of differences between groups located in separate environments that can lead to the formation  of  a  new  species  (Anderson  et  al.  2010).  In  a  social‐ecological  system,  ‘divergent’  or deviating  adaptation  refers  to  the  process  of  shifting  adaptive  capacities  of  alternate  actors, entities,  or  livelihood  systems.  Thereby,  adaptation  of  one  individual  or  group  can  produce  an increase  (+/+),  decrease  (+/‐)  or  neutral  change  (+/0)  in  another  individual  or  group’s  adaptive capacity  in a shared ecosystem. An example of divergent adaptation is  illustrated by the adaptive actions of  the agro pastoralists  in  the Niger case study which reduce the adaptive capacity of  the pastoralists (Snorek et al. (2012). 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In the course of such a dynamic adaptation process and path, cooperation and conflict can coexist, mutually influence, amplify, or reduce adaptive capacity and adaptation strategies. The focus is on the  dynamic  interaction  of  conflict  and  cooperation  between  different  actors  (individuals,  social groups,  communities,  governments  at  various  levels).  Both  conflict  and  cooperation  and  the combination of the two can increase and decrease hydro‐security  and human security at the same time for different (interacting) actors.   This  framework makes  the dynamic nature of human  security more  explicit  than before with  its circle of stresses, responses, adaptation,  impacts and feedbacks. This makes  it applicable to cases where  there  are  temporal  trade‐offs  in  human  security,  for  example,  in  the  Ethiopia  case  study (Milman and Arsano, 2012).  
5. Summary of key theoretical findings  
Climate change, hydro­security and human security: adaptation can both reduce 
and exacerbate insecurities Climate change and water related stresses have an impact on human security in addition to a whole range of other social and political  influences on human security. Policy responses  in  the name of adaptation (Milman and Arsano, 2012) and also autonomous responses of individuals and groups (Snorek  et  al.  2012)  are  one  more  channel  through  which  hydro‐climatic  impacts  can  be experienced. Adaptations  can have unequal  impacts  or  increase  the  inequality  between different groups.  Divergent  adaptation,  which  occurs  where  one  individual  or  group’s  adaptive  response reduces  the  adaptive  capacity  of  another  individual  or  group,  can  increase  conflict  and  reduce human  security  (Snorek  et  al.  2012).  Adaptation  policy  and  interventions  are  subject  to  power relations  that  also  play  out  in  the  way  that  diverging  values,  adaptation  preferences  and vulnerabilities are prioritised (Albizua and Zografos, 2012). Hegemonic power relations can result in some aspects of security being prioritised over others (Milman and Arsano, 2012). For example planned  adaptation  responses  may  reduce  risks  from  some  hydro‐climate  stressors  but  expose people  to  new  risks  or  undermine  human  security  in  other  ways,  for  example  by  reducing livelihood security (Gebert et al., 2012) or short term food security (Milman and Arsano, 2012).  
Climate,  water  and  conflict:  the  importance  of  social,  political  and  economic 
factors CLICO evidence suggests that conflict is associated with societal responses to hydro‐climatic stress rather  than with  the  impacts  of  hydro‐climate  stresses  themselves  (Albizua  and  Zografos,  2012; Milman and Arsano, 2012; Snorek et al., 2012). For the majority of conflict situations studied in the CLICO project, the political, economic and social factors are considered to be of greater importance now than the hydro‐climatic stresses (Böhmelt et al., 2012; Fischhendler and Katz, 2012; Snorek et al., 2012), although how this balance may change in the future is not clear. However, there is much evidence for links between these different factors and one type of uncertainty or stress can impact upon others (Fischhendler and Katz, 2012) and exacerbate existing conflicts (Milman and Arsano, 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2012; Snorek et al., 2012). Factors  that  influence conflict are multi‐scalar and build up over  long time scales, for example Selby and Hoffman (2012) emphasise that the conflict and environmental degradation seen in Sudan result from the historically shaped and evolving nature of the state and its institutions that are conditioned by agents and structures at the local, national and global scale.    The examples of conflict documented in the CLICO case studies take many different forms from low level, ‘silent’ or latent conflict, for example in the Ebro delta (Albizua and Zografos, 2012) to conflict involving violence,  for example  in Niger  (Snorek et al., 2012) and Gambella  (Milman and Arsano, 2012). Where conflict is severe and prolonged, and frequently violent, it can be a significant driver of vulnerability  to climate change (for example  in  the  Jordan West Bank case study (Tamimi and Abu Jamous, 2012), the Gambella study (Milman and Arsano, 2012) and the Sudan study (Selby and Hoffmann, 2012). The degree of political freedom experienced in a country appears to influence the nature  of  conflict:  more  democratic  countries  experience  more  conflictual  events  but  a  lower intensity of conflict (i.e. less violent instances of conflict) than non‐democratic countries (Böhmelt et  al.,  2012).  This  suggests  that  political  freedom  can  allow  conflicting  views  to  be  expressed. However, freedom to debate alternatives can be closed down even in democratic countries by the securitization of relevant issues5 (Albizua and Zografos, 2012; Dalisa, 2012). 
Links between conflict, cooperation and adaptive capacity There  was  some  evidence  at  the  transboundary  scale  for  conflict  or  uncertainties  to  promote cooperation  (Fischhendler  and  Katz,  2012)  and  for  conflict  resolution  mechanisms  to  address uncertainties and potential disputes (Fischhendler and De Bruyne, 2012). At the sub‐national scale the database of water  related  events6  recorded  slightly more  cooperative  events  than  conflictive ones, with nearly half  the events recorded as neither cooperative nor conflictive (Bernauer et al., 2012).  Cooperation  or  collaboration  is  seen  as  important  for  adaptive  capacity,    however transaction costs can influence the success of cooperation (Fischhendler and De Bruyne, 2012) and some types of cooperation can reinforce unequal situations .  
State­led policy for adaptation and adaptive capacity Studies diverged in their position regarding the role of the state in adaptation and what constitutes adaptive capacity.  The nation state is adopted as the key institution for adaptation planning by the UNFCCC.  On  the  one  hand,  Gerstetter  et  al.  (2012)  point  out  the  state  has  a  certain  function  in adaptation  as  it  often  defines  the  regulatory  framework  governing  adaptation  actions  by individuals,  organisations  and  communities.  They  describe  how  in  some  countries  it  is  the  state rather than individual actors that are pushing adaptation.  On the other hand, Milman and Arsano (2012) question the appropriateness of a strong role for the state  in  adaptation where  the  views  of  state  actors  are  not  representative  of  those  of  the  entire population, as occurs in Ethiopia where the state adopts a view that modernisation should occur at                                                         5  Securitisation  refers  to  the  framing of  an  issue  “in  terms of  security… drawing on perceptions of  national,  local  or individual (in)security” (Zeitoun, 2007: 115) 6  The database was  compiled  from media  sources  for  35  countries  of  the Mediterranean, Middle East  and  the  Sahel between 1997 and 2009 (Bernauer et al. 2012). 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the  expense of  traditional  livelihoods. Milman and Arsano  suggest  that questions  arise when  the state  intervenes  as  to  “who  and  what  is  prioritised  and  how  such  determinations  are  made?” Adaptation  interventions  or  policies  promoted  by  the  state  can  fail  to  consider  the  diversity  of preferences  and  social,  political  and  environmental  contexts  in  which  marginalised  populations find themselves and therefore fail to meet their adaptation needs (Gebert et al. 2012, Milman and Arsano 2012; Turhan, 2012) Moreover, Turhan (2012) showed how inadequate state policies had shifted  the  responsibility  of  adaptation  on  to  individuals  (migrant  agricultural  labourers),  who were  unable  to  change  the  socio‐institutional  structure  and  conditions  responsible  for  their marginalisation. In Niger, it was a lack of enforcement of policies that left individuals inadequately supported in their adaptation efforts (Snorek et al. 2012). Despite these reservations about state‐led adaptation, some authors saw  improvement  in  the adaptive capacity of state  institutions as a necessary  condition  for  improving  the  adaptive  capacity  of  the  population  (Gebert  et  al.,  2012; Selby and Hoffmann, 2012; Snorek et al., 2012).   With  respect  to  institutional  adaptive  capacity,  there  was  an  emphasis  on  the  importance  of improved coordination between sectors and actors at multiple scales (Gerstetter et al., 2012) from the transboundary (Milman et al., 2012) to the local (Albizua and Zografos, 2012) as well as better access  to  knowledge,  and  sufficient  ability  of  policy  actors  to  respond  to  new  challenges  and financial  opportunities  (Gerstetter  et  al.,  2012).  In  some  cases,  multiple  uncertainties  create complexities that acted as significant barriers to planning adaptive responses (Gebert et al., 2012) and  in  others  institutional  and  infrastructural  gaps  and  poor  access  to  data  were  seen  as  key barriers  to  the  development  of  adaptive  capacity  (Selby  and  Hoffmann,  2012).  An  improved accountability of state institutions (Selby and Hoffmann, 2012; Snorek et al., 2012), more universal access  to  justice,  less  corruption  and  adequate  enforcement  of  appropriate  rules  (Snorek  et  al., 2012) were also seen as requirements for improved adaptive capacity.  
Conditions for successful adaptation  The  success  of  adaptive  responses  depends  on  the  perspective  taken.  Diverging  values  and preferences  account  for  different  adaptation  outcomes.  Where  different  values,  perspectives, culture  and  traditions  are  not  taken  into  account  there  is  a  risk  of  tensions  and mal‐adaptation (Albizua  and  Zografos,  2012;  Gebert  et  al.,  2012;  Milman  and  Arsano,  2012;  Turhan,  2012). Although evidence is essential for making adaptation decisions, tensions could arise where expert and scientific knowledge is privileged over other types of knowledge (Albizua and Zografos, 2012). Processes of adaptation planning and development that are deliberative and incorporate multiple perspectives  can  improve  policy  effectiveness  by  reducing  the  risk  of  increased  insecurities  and conflict  arising  from  adaptation  (Albizua  and  Zografos,  2012;  Pascual  et  al.,  2012).    However, deliberative processes are open to manipulation of the less powerful by those with more power and have high costs to implement (Chilvers, 2009).  Some  of  the  findings  add  to  the  debate  in  the  climate  change  adaptation  literature  about transformational versus incremental adaptation. Incremental adaptations, which maintain current functions  of  socio‐ecological  systems,  are  seen  as  potentially  inadequate  in  some  locations  and systems  for  responding  to  the  high  rates  of  climate  change  predicted  for  the  21st  century  and beyond.  Large  changes  in  climate  coupled with high  vulnerability may  in  some  locations  require 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transformational adaptation, involving new adaptations that transform places or change locations (Kates  et  al.  2012).  Nevertheless,  Milman  and  Arsano  (2012)  and  Gebert  et  al.  (2012)  raise concerns  about  transformational  adaptation,  which  in  the  Gambella  case  study,  increased vulnerabilities to some risks and reduced the human security of the populations most affected, at least in the short term (Milman and Arsano, 2012). Gebert et al. (2012) recommended that planned resettlement, which could be considered a transformational adaptation, should address livelihoods sustainability and provide incentives that are targeted. These two cases of Alexandria (Gebert et al., 2012)  and  Gambella  (Milman  and  Arsano,  2012)  support  an  argument  in  favour  of  a  balance between incrementalism and transformation in adaptation to climate change. 
Lessons  from a political  ecology perspective:  the  role  of  the  state  in hydro and 
human security Kallis and Zografos (2012) explain that a subject’s exposure to hydro‐climate stress and resultant hydro‐insecurity  is  the  function  not  only  of  their  environment  but  also  wider,  long  term  socio‐political insecurities associated with aspects of the political economy such as land investments and world markets.  In addition, Milman and Arsano (2012) suggest  that an under appreciation of  the political  ecology  of  climate  change  adaptation  may  also  cause  further  conflict  and  human insecurities  in  the  future.  According  to  Milman  and  Arsano  (2012)  the  costs  and  benefits  of development interventions in vulnerable regions like Gambella, Ethiopia, are determined to a large extent  by  relationships  between  politics,  economics  and  power.  Consequently,  the  political economy  of  an  area  controls  the  type  of  adaptive  response  and  also  the  component  of  human security prioritized. Milman and Arsano assert  that more studies need to explore how authority,  interests and power are distributed and how these forces influence climate adaptation outcomes.  Other findings raise attention on the power implications of de‐politicising decision‐making through state  actions  that  securitise  the  issue  of  adaptation  (Albizua  and  Zografos,  2012)  or  disaster response and reconstruction (D’Alisa and Kallis, 2012). Power effects are also evident in adaptation responses  that  may  fail  to  consider  value  dimensions  of  climate  change  (Albizua  and  Zografos, 2012; Turhan, 2012) and hence result in the silencing of some voices that could lead to increased insecurity, a sense of injustice, and potentially conflict. Turhan (2012) describes state interventions in the name of adaptation as ‘biopolitics’ (Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2011; Reid, 2010, in Turhan 2012) since they attempt to “create adaptable individuals who neither threaten the existing economic nor the political order” (Turhan, 2012, p4). There is evidence in some case studies of state actors and policies adopting a climate change discourse to control the adaptation agenda for their own aims (Milman and Arsano, 2012; Turhan, 2012).  Selby  and  Hoffman  (2012)  draw  attention  to  the  experience  of  ecological  degradation  and  the production  of  scarcity  that  result  from  state  development  policies  and  conflict  in  Sudan.  They describe how these policies are themselves subject to social forces and interests that are made up of multiple actors that need to be recognised, rather than one abstract entity of ‘the state’. Selby and Hoffman (2012) and Albizua and Zografos (2012) also raise the role of water demand, in particular for  irrigated  agriculture,  in  the  social  production  of water  scarcities.  Such hydro‐insecurities  are created  not  only  locally  and  nationally  but mediated  by  the  global  political  economy  and  global 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geopolitical  structures.  Examples  include  the  consequences  for  hydro‐security  of  foreign  direct investments in land in Ethiopia (Milman and Arsano, 2012) and Sudan (Selby and Hoffman, 2012).  Finally, studies also highlight the importance of political uncertainty as an element of the political environment that contributes to weak state institutional capacity to deal with insecurity (Gebert et al. 2012; Tamimi and Abu Jamous, 2012). 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